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Abstract 
The objective of the paper is to determine if family firms are able to provide a return premium 
compared to their non-family counterparts. The assumption is that some of the benefits and 
costs related to family ownership can be absorbed into the business model. This may mean that 
family characteristics could actually impact the perception of the market and in turn affect their 
returns.  We test this by using a unique sample of 152 family firms and matching them with 
non-family firms on the basis their sector, stock market index and size. Three models – CAPM, 
Fama-French 3-factor model and Carhart model – are used to test a trading strategy, i.e. buying 
family firms and selling short non-family firms, on the FTSE All Share, Fledgling and AIM 
Index. The results showed that the strategy is able to generate an abnormal profit for the firms 
on the FTSE All Share and Fledgling but fails to do so on the AIM in the presence of the 
‘momentum’ factor-mimicking portfolio. It is far more profitable to use a trading strategy of 
buying past winners and selling short past losers on the AIM. We further investigate into the 
factors that drive the returns of family and non-family firms. Using factors related to risk, price-
level, liquidity and growth-potential, we find that family firm returns are driven by their growth 
potential where as non-family firms’ need to balance their risk in order to increase returns. A 
similar application on the 3 indices mentioned above reveals that the AIM and the Fledgling 
index behave similarly but differ from the FTSE All Share portfolio of firms.  
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‘Small businesses make a vital contribution to the overall health of the UK economy and to 
improving the productivity of UK business.’ 
                               -   Annual Survey of Small Businesses – UK 2004/5, Small Business Services 
 
Family  firms  exist  in  all  countries  mostly  as  independent  private  companies.  In  the  UK  at 
present there are 7,505 small businesses that contribute to the UK economy. About two-thirds 
of these firms have a sales turnover between £58,000 and £1 million and around 15% of them 
over  £1.5  million  for  2004/5.  Around  71%  of  these  firms  classify  themselves  as  family 
businesses. Out of this 73% of these firms were controlled by the first generation and 19% by 
the second. Only 6% of these family firms were run by the third and fourth generations. This is 
not surprising as the survey found that only 27% of these businesses will in future opt to keep 
the business in the family and 25% will sell their businesses. However, it is important to note 
that 42% of the family firms have not made any plans for the future
1.  
 
These figures exhibit the classic problem that family firms in small businesses face today. There 
is clearly a lack of direction for firm growth. These small family businesses seem to perish 
away because of a multitude of problems, some of which stem from their firm resolve to ensure 
that the business is free from outside intervention. The Annual Survey of Small Businesses – 
UK 2004/5 found that non-family firms were more likely to go for positive growth. These facts 
paint a very bleak outlook for family firms planning to expand operations in the future. In our 
unique sample of quoted family firms in the UK we found around 199 firms that could be 
classified as ‘family’ by a set of criteria. So there is evidence that some family businesses do 
find  a  healthy  balance  between  control  and  management  for  their  firm,  which  serves  their 
shareholders as well. But the concern is that the number of ‘quoted’ family firms in our sample 
is still very low compared to the number of small businesses presented above. Clearly a large 
part of them do not survive to reach the public investor. Therefore it is important to understand 
whether the ones that do survive have an advantage compared to their non-family firms. In 
particular, it is important to focus on the returns of these firms as it can be used as a yardstick 
for comparison between family and non-family firms.  
                                                           
1 Data taken from the Annual Survey of Small Businesses – UK 2004/5 undertaken by the Small Business Services and the UK 
National Statistics  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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Family firms have known to exhibit a number of advantages mostly related to the presence of a 
founder’s entrepreneurial talent (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), long-term horizon of a family firm 
(Stein 1988, 1989), access to cheaper debt and stable relationships with suppliers and other 
stakeholders (Anderson et. al., 2002). They are also benefited by reduced agency costs because 
of the feelings of altruism and unity within the family or due to the emotional pressure that 
sometimes exist in family business units (Chami, 1999; Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000; Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985).  One of the strong focuses of family firms is the need to pass on wealth to future 
generations and the ‘steward’ like attitude of family firm management (Van den Berghe & 
Carchon, 2003; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). This ensures that the best possible use 
of resources and investments are made. Family firms also tend to work better because they tend 
pass on ‘idiosyncratic knowledge’ from one generation to the next which ensures that good 
business policies are held on to (Bjuggren & Sund, 2001). All these characteristics may add to 
the appeal of family firms to investors and could give them an edge compared to their non-
family  counterpart.  However  a  number  of  disadvantages  with  respect  to  nepotism  and 
favouritism in the family  can hamper the business’s economic progress. When families are 
large shareholders in the firm and promote management from within the family, employers are 
often  disgruntled  about  the  lack  of  opportunities  for  progress  (Shleifer  &  Vishny,  1997). 
Minority  shareholders  may  be  expropriated  through  excessive  compensation  schemes  and 
dividends in favour of family members (Schack, 2001). Family firms, as large shareholders, are 
known  to  extract  private  benefits  and  use  their  control  over  the  firm  to  use  operating  and 
financial resources for their own benefit (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000). Large block holdings 
often discourage the market for corporate control and as such could reduce firm value (Barclay 
& Holderness, 1989). It is difficult to judge the exact impact on returns in the presence of these 
benefits and costs. Section 2 presents the literary review of research in the areas of asset pricing 
and family firm performance and helps to tie in the two areas in support of our main idea, which 
is presented below. 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate if we can use a zero-cost trading strategy of buying 
family firms and selling short non-family firms to earn abnormal profits, on the assumption that 
the unique characteristics of family firms gives it an edge in the stock market. We accomplish 
this by using existing asset-pricing models like CAPM, Fama-French (1993) 3 factor model and 
the Carhart (1997) model (i.e. Fama-French 3 factor plus a fourth factor, momentum). These ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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models have been based on the fact that various factors like beta risk, size, book-to-market 
value, market returns and momentum are possible explanatory factors of the excess returns of 
stock assets. The aim is to see if an abnormal return can be earned over an above the portfolios 
mimicking the factors mentioned above.  
 
Section 3 presents the data and methodology of the paper. We use a unique sample of 199 
family firms and match them with non-family firms on the basis of sector, stock market index 
(i.e. FTSE All Share, Fledgling and AIM), and size. We found a match for 152 family firms 
based  on  the  three  demanding  factors  mentioned  above.  This  brings  our  total  ‘combined’ 
matched sample to 304 firms. The average age of the family firms is approximately 16 years. 
These firms are fairly young though it is not surprising as they mainly dominate the AIM index, 
which is known for its young growth firms. An investment of a £100 in the beginning of 2000 
would give a return of 23.36% on the AIM, 19.92% on the Fledgling and 6.71% for the FTSE 
All share family firms at the end of 2004. We find that using the asset pricing models (which 
are also sometimes called performance attribution models) we are able to earn an abnormal 
profit from the zero-investment strategy mentioned above in most of the cases, except where 
momentum on the AIM is used as a factor. It shows that the strategy of buying past winners and 
selling short past losers will earn a higher profit than any other trading strategy on the AIM 
Index for our sample of firms. This is an important finding, as the AIM is known as a growth 
index. Therefore the fact that the expectations of a consistent growth rate drive the returns of 
firms on this market is an important result from the point of view of investors.  
 
Section 4 delves deeper into the factors that drive the return differences between ‘matched’ 
family and non-family firms. We use factors related to risk, liquidity, price-level and growth as 
important characteristics that help in understanding the fundamental return differences between 
family firms and their non-family counterparts. We find that family firm returns are driven by 
their growth potential whereas non-family firm investors should watch the risk levels to assess 
their impact on returns. We use the same methodology on all (i.e. family and non-family) the 
firms on the three different indices and find fundamental differences between the FTSE All 
Share firms and the AIM and Fledgling firms. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1: Factors affecting firm returns and performance 
There are a number of factors related to firms and the market that have an impact on returns of 
the firm. A large amount of literature in empirical research deals with providing an alternative 
explanation of the Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), where the cross-section of the expected returns has a linear relationship with the beta 
of the firm. Research has found that this linear CAPM relationship between risk and the returns 
of a firm is not the only way if representing the risk-return trade-off. Other firm characteristics 
such as firm size (e.g. Banz (1981)), earning yield (e.g. Basu (1977, 1983)), Debt/Equity ratio 
(e.g. Bhandari (1988)), Dividend Yield (e.g. Fama & French (1988)), and the ratio of a firm’s 
book value to its market value (e.g. Fama & French 1992)), have also been related to returns. 
However there has been some controversy regarding the findings of some of these studies with 
some researchers suggesting that the results are affected by survivorship bias in the data used 
(Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995), Brown and Goetzmann, (1995) and Brown, Goetzmann, 
and Ross (1995)). Others like Black  (1993), Merton (1988) and  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
suggest that the results may have been derived from some kind of data snooping prior to the 
testing. However the results may have been obtained, the bottom line is that the fundamental 
nature of the results of these studies still holds.  
As we have discussed above that returns can be affected by the differences in the risk or the 
‘style’ of different portfolios. Equity, bond and macroeconomic variables have all been found to 
contribute to the cross-sectional market returns of a firm. Fama & French (1993) find five risk 
factors to explain the returns of stocks and bonds. The 3 factors related to the stock market are – 
firm size, book-to-market equity, excess market return and the two other factors, maturity and 
default risk, are associated to the bond market. The paper uses the monthly returns of NYSE 
stocks over a period of 28 years (1963-1991), which are regressed on the market portfolio of 
stock  returns  and  portfolios  mimicking  size,  book-to-market  equity  (BE/ME),  and  term-
structure risk factors of returns. They split the sample into 25 portfolios according to firm size 
(i.e. share price x no. of shares) and BE/ME (i.e. Book Equity/ Market Equity) and use the 
excess returns of these portfolios as the dependant variable. They find that factors mimicking 
firm size and BE/ME can explain most of the variation in stock returns and by adding the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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excess  market  return  they  find  that  the  intercepts  for  the  time-series  regression  with  the 
portfolio mimicking factors is almost 0. Therefore market factor and the risk factors relating to 
size and BE/ME help in explaining the cross-section of average returns. Smaller firms earn 
higher returns as a reward for the risk. From a study of their data they discovered that small 
firms were only slightly less profitable than larger firms till 1981. However after the recession 
in 1982 small firms had a prolonged slump in earnings and were not affected by the boom in the 
late 80s. So the vulnerability of smaller firms to economic downturns that do not affect larger 
firms the same way, makes size an important risk factor that helps in explaining the negative 
relationship between size and returns.  The same is true for high BE/ME firms and they also 
have  a  positive  relationship  with  returns.  Value  firms  are  sometimes  considered  as  ‘fallen 
angels’ and as such will require higher compensation for the higher risks.   
Kothari et. al. (1995) examined the cross-section of the expected stock returns and found that 
there was a significant compensation of around 6-9% per annum for beta risk. This is possible 
when the beta is calculated from time-series regressions of the yearly portfolio returns and the 
annual return of an equal weighted market index. The proposed relationship between book-to-
market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than those presented by Fama & French 
(1992). They conjecture that the empirical results of the Fama & French paper are a result of 
using COMPUSTAT data, which is affected by a selection bias.  
Chan & Chen (1991) study the reaction of firms of different sizes to the same economic event. 
They  found  that  the  structural  characteristic  differences  between  the  different  sized  firms 
revealed that the small portfolio firms have a large proportion of marginal firms with poor 
performance, low production efficiency and high financial leverage. These firms are sensitive to 
price changes and are more likely to be affected by adverse economic conditions. Therefore any 
economic news affects the returns of smaller firms more than larger firms. To test that the ‘size’ 
effects propounded in earlier literature are actually derived from the ‘marginal’ firms present in 
the small firms portfolio, they construct two size-matched return indices of marginal firms. One 
index  consists  of the  all  the  distressed
2  marginal  firms  by  taking  their  average  returns  and 
deducting  the  average  returns  of  all  healthy  small  firms.  The  second  index  is  the  return 
difference between a portfolio of firms highly leveraged and a portfolio of low leveraged firms 
that are all small in size. They use the firms listed on the NYSE from 1956 to 1985 and collect 
                                                           
2 The paper defines a distressed firm as a firm making substantial cutback in dividends as it portrays cash flow problems.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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firm data from CRSP monthly files. They show that the time-series return differences of small 
and large firms is to an extent captured by the reaction to economic news of the marginal firms 
and the highly leverage firms. The market index, which leans heavily on the large firms in the 
index, is unable to capture the risks of the small firm.   
Banz (1981) studied the empirical relationship between returns and the market value of the 
NYSE common stocks. He used a sample of firms quoted on the NYSE for at least five years 
for the period of 1926 to 1975. The data used in the paper are monthly returns, price and 
number of shares outstanding from CRSP. They divided their sample of firms into 25 equal 
portfolios based on market size and beta of each firm and found that smaller NYSE firms earn 
higher risk adjusted returns than the larger NYSE firms. This size effect is not linear and is 
pronounced in smaller firms and the effect is also not stable over time.  
Basu (1983) studied a sample of firms on the NYSE for a period of 13 year from 1963 to 1979. 
To be included in the sample a firm would have to be listed as on 1
st January of each year and 
traded for at least the first month of that year. Accounting information on earnings per share on 
a 12-month moving basis for the year ending December 1962 to 1978 were collected along with 
the stock prices, returns and common share data (i.e. to obtain market value of the firm). He 
found that firms with higher E/P ratios earn on average higher risk-adjusted returns than stocks 
with lower E/P ratios. This effect remains even when he controls for firm size. 
Critics like Reinganum (1981) while commenting on a version of the paper argue that the E/P 
ratio effect on returns is only a manifestation of the size effect. Using a composite sample of 
firms from the AMEX-NYSE he finds that the size effect subsumes the E/P effect. So even 
though both the size and the earning yields anomalies are related to the factors causing the 
misspecification of the CAPM model, it seems that these factors are more closely associated 
with the size of the firm than the E/P ratio of the same firm. Basu (1981) argues that according 
to Ball (1978), the E/P ratio of a firm can be used as a direct proxy for expected returns. Thus, it 
stands to reason that E/P ratio is a much better factor in explaining the expected returns in the 
case where the asset-pricing model is misspecified. Size of a firm is not always an obvious 
variable directly related to the expected returns of the firm. However, he does suggest that there 
are some factors that can solve the misspecification of the asset-pricing model that may be 
correlated to the market value of a firm. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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The business cycle of an economy can affect the returns that we expect from stocks and 
bonds. Fama & French (1989) study the relationship between expected returns of stocks and 
bonds and business conditions. They used a value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio of 
stocks on the NYSE. The value-weighted portfolio gives emphasis to larger stocks while the 
equal-weighted portfolio emphasizes on smaller stock. They use a sample of monthly returns 
and yields of corporate bonds from 1926-1987 maintained by Ibbotson Associates. One of the 
explanatory variables is the Dividend Yield (D/P) on the value-weighted NYSE portfolio. 
They find that the dividend yield also helps in forecasting bond returns, which is unique to 
their research. They also identify that the two reasons for the time-variation of long-term 
corporate bonds are – the term spread and the default spread. They find that default spread is 
related  to  the  business-condition  variable.  The  dividend  yield  is  correlated  to  the  default 
spread and moves in a similar pattern, i.e. high during periods of depression and low during 
periods when economy is strong. The term-spread is related to the short-term nature of the 
business cycle – low near peaks and high on business-cycle troughs. The two explanations 
they provide are that when business conditions are poor returns from stocks and bonds need to 
be  high  to  help  induce  the  substitution  from  consumption  to  investment.  The  other 
explanation is of course the risk angle, whereby the high returns are compensation for the 
higher risk affecting businesses during these periods.  
Chen (1991) analysed the changes in macroeconomic variables and their relations with changes 
in financial investment opportunities. The paper considers certain state variables - aggregate 
production  growth,  yield  spreads  between  low  grade  and  high  grade  bonds,  yield  spreads 
between long- and short-term government bonds, short-term interest rates, and dividend yields 
– as important influencing factors in explaining the asset pricing equilibrium and can help in 
forecasting  the  expected  returns  of  stocks  and  bonds.  The  object  of  the  paper  was  to  test 
whether these state variables are related to the macroeconomy, which is consistent with the 
forecasts of the asset returns. The results show that the state variables are related to changes in 
the macroeconomy. The current dividend yield and the default premium are indicators of the 
current situation of the economy as measured by the real GNP and consumption. The current 
short-term interest rate, the current term structure and the lagged industrial production growth 
rate help in forecasting the changes in the future GNP growth rates.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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Another factor that has impacted the returns of a firm are past returns of the same firm, i.e. 
momentum and contrarian effects. The momentum effect exists in relative strength strategies 
that buy past winners and sell past losers and has been studied by several researchers. Levy 
(1967) used this relative strength strategy (i.e. buying stocks performing consistently above the 
average over a 27-week time period) and found that abnormal returns could be earned. However 
critics like Jensen & Bennington (1970) by using the strategy over a longer time period, outside 
Levy’s sample, found that this was not a consistent strategy and attributes Levy’s results to 
survival bias in his data. Practitioners and researchers of mutual funds (Grinblatt & Titman 
(1989,1991), Carhart (1997)) have often used the momentum effect as these funds exhibit a 
tendency  to  buy  stocks  that  have  performed  well  over  the  previous  financial  quarter.  This 
suggests that relative strength strategies can be useful in generating abnormal returns. Jegadeesh 
& Titman (1993) used the relative strength strategy on NYSE and AMEX stocks over a 3- to 
12-month holding period. They realised significant profits over the sample period, i.e. from 
1965 to 1989 and by testing the different sources of these profits they found that their results 
could be a consequence of delayed price reactions to information relating to the firm. They also 
find that these relative strength portfolios formed over different holding periods of 3- to 12-
month horizons experience negative abnormal returns from a year after their formation and 
continue to have the same results until the thirty-first month.  
However, another strategy, which works on the opposite assumption that it is possible to take 
advantage of investors’ overreaction to market information, seems to have a lot of attention 
from  researchers.  Debondt  &  Thaler  (1985,  1987)  studied  stock  price  overreactions  to 
information  and  found  that  contrarian  strategies  (i.e.,  buying  past  losers  and  selling  past 
winners)  can  achieve  abnormal  returns.  They  found  that  selecting  the  stocks  that  did  not 
perform well for the last 3-5 years and holding them over the next 3-5 years achieved abnormal 
returns compared to a strategy of holding stocks that did do well over the same time period. 
However, these results have been debated and some critics feel that as the losers outperform the 
winner stocks only in January that it might not be an overreaction effect. Others feel that their 
results can simply be explained by the size effect and systematic risk. Jegadeesh (1990) while 
studying the predictability of stock returns found that the negative first-order serial correlations 
in the monthly returns of a firm are highly significant and that there are strong signs of positive 
serial correlation at longer lags, which suggests short-term return reversals.  But it is not clear 
whether these results are a consequence of overreaction or develop because of some short-term ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market. These contrarian strategies rely heavily on 
being able to buy and sell over a short period of time making this kind of strategy transaction 
cost reliant. So short-term price movements are the most important. Lo & McKinlay (1990) 
found that most of the results in Jegadeesh (1990) was an effect of delayed reaction to common 
factors rather than any kind of overreaction.    
Traditionally,  the  emphasis  of  tests  determining  which  factors  affect  the  cross-section  of 
expected stock returns is based on theoretical models of asset pricing (Fama & MacBeth, 1973) 
or variables that can explain the covariance’s between stocks (Chen, 1983). If the stock market 
is efficient and liquid then risk is the main factor in the differences between expected returns. 
However, if the stocks have different liquidity or the pricing of the stocks are biased relative to 
the information set then many non-risk factors can be important in explaining cross-section 
stock returns. The Haugen Model (1996) assumes this and uses five categories of factors to help 
predict expected returns. These five classes are risk, liquidity, price-level, growth potential and 
price-history. The factor model derives the monthly payoffs from these characteristics using 
OLS multivariate analysis. They use monthly stocks of the Russell 3000 stock Index (i.e. 3000 
of the largest U.S stock) from 1979 to 1993. Over this period they run 180 multiple regressions 
to help explain differential monthly returns using factors related to the five classes mentioned 
above. It helps in establishing the most important factors influencing cross-section expected 
returns. To test the model they estimate each stock’s expected returns and rank them into ten 
equally weighted deciles. They find that the spread between the highest and the lowest return 
deciles is around 35%. The analysis is then extended to four other countries: 208 French Stocks, 
195 stocks in Germany, 715 in Japan and 406 UK stocks from 1985 to mid 1994. The model is 
powerful in all cases and there is a surprising amount of commonality of factors and their signs 
between  the  different  countries.  The  commonality  does  not  stem  from  the  high  correlation 
between monthly payoffs. Their explanation for all the results is that it stems from the bias of 
market pricing in all of these five countries and is not related to risk. 
Besides the factors mentioned above one element that seems to affect the value of the firm is 
corporate  governance  and  ownership  of  the  firm.  Firms  are  owned  by  shareholders  and 
controlled by management and if that management happens to be family-controlled then the 
corporate governance becomes even more complicated. All this seems to have an impact on 
performance of the firms and could also lead to return differences.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) use the Fama & French model to help explain the return 
differences between two very distinct portfolios based on governance factors. The approach was 
to build an index to help measure how much power is in the hands of management on the basis 
of  certain  governance  rules  followed  by  the  firm.  The  publications  of  the  Investor 
Responsibility Research Center provide 24 different corporate-governance provisions for 1500 
firms from 1990 to 1999. The firms were then ranked into deciles according to their cumulative 
score on the index, where the lower deciles represented firms with the most democracy for 
shareholders. They the return differences of a portfolio where they bought the firms in the 
lowest decile and sold short the ‘Dictatorship’ portfolio (i.e. the highest decile).  They then 
applied the Fama-French model for their sample and found that the intercept of the Fama-
French  model  was  positive  and  significant  meaning  that  differences  with  regards  to  size, 
BE/ME and market returns alone could not explain the return differences between the two 
deciles.  
So why does ownership and control matter? Jensen & Meckling (1976) in their seminal work on 
‘agency theory’ bring out the importance of aligning the interests of owners and managers. 
When a manager has control of the firm without any ownership issues then he can expropriate 
non-pecuniary benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Giving managers some ownership 
of the firm can be used as a disciplinary tool. However, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
when  management  ownership  goes  beyond  a  certain  level  there  might  be  ‘entrenchment’ 
problems,  whereby  the  managers  are  secure  in  their  positions.  The  heavily  entrenched 
management  makes  it  harder  to  allocate  resources  efficiently  through  takeovers,  which  can 
reduce the value of the firm. Thus it seems hard to determine the most appropriate amount of 
management shareholding.  
There  are  several  other  studies  that  have  examined  the  empirical  relationship  between 
ownership  and  performance
3.  However,  each  study  presents  a  different  share  ownership 
threshold for the ideal balance of control and ownership, which makes it difficult to implement 
it as a policy. The purpose of this paper is to understand the return implications of different 
ownership structures and therefore we need not take any stand on this issue.  
                                                           
3 Morck et al. (1988); Wruck (1989); McConnell & Servaes (1990); Stulz (1988); Mudambi & Nicosia (1995) ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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If ownership is an important factor in determining performance then family ownership could 
also be an important variable that may affect performance. Anderson & Reeb (2003) found that 
family firms outperformed their non-family counterparts. The relationship between performance 
and ownership levels is however non-linear and increases in the presence of a family CEO. The 
above results were obtained by using accounting measures of performance to compare family 
firms and non-family firms. Thomson Financial conducted a study whereby they developed a 
unique index for family and non-family firms in six European countries - Germany, France, 
Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and UK, and tracked them over a 10-year period until December 
2003. In Germany, the returns of family firms led by BMW soared 203% compared to the 
paltry growth of 47% for their non-family counterparts. In France too the returns of the family 
firm index soared by 203% compared to 76% for the non-family firms. Overall family firms 
seem to outperform their non-family counterpart, which provides some empirical evidence as to 
their profitability using market values like returns of a firm. Stoy Hayward (1992a) analysed 
share value and found that if £1 was invested in the FT All Share Index in 1970 it would grow 
to £8.72 by 1991. However, if £1 was invested in quoted family firms it would have grown to 
£11.11.  So family firms seem to provide a better return for investors than their non-family 
counterparts. There may be a number of factors contributing to the result. One of the reasons 
could be the intrinsic value of a family business, which is driven by the unique characteristics 
and organizational structures that exist in such establishments. 
 
2.2: - Positive and Negative qualities associated with Family firms 
The Thomson Financial Study presents a difference between the returns of family firms and 
non-family firms. These return differences arise because of the familial orientation of the firms 
than because of other differences. So what is that distinguishes family firms from their non-
family counterparts and even translates into performance? Family firms seem to have a number 
of positive and negative attributes that are related to the intricate governance and organisational 
structure of the company. This develops because of the complex familial relations between the 
family, management, shareholders and outsiders. 
Firms where the family has a large voting right can approve plans that lead to the expropriation 
of  smaller  shareholders.  This  can  be  through  excessive  compensation  or  special  dividends ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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(Shack, 2001). Family firms tend to use their capital expansion plans to their advantage thereby 
ensuring the steady flow of special dividends. However, by ignoring the needs of the business 
and other shareholders their operating and stock market performance can be affected (DeAngelo 
& DeAngelo, 2000). Large shareholders tend to exert a lot of control over the company and can 
use it to their advantage by extracting private benefits. In the event of a potential bid for large 
block holdings a premium is paid to account for these private benefits. This might dissuade 
potential  bidders  and  as  a  consequence  reduce  firm  value  (Barclay  and  Holderness,  1989). 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) find that large shareholders often want to be part of management 
without the requisite qualifications or experience, thus reducing firm value. Managers have the 
best knowledge of a company’s opportunity set and can take important investment decisions to 
help the growth of the business. However, in the presence of large shareholders who exert 
inordinate amount of control over the firm these managerial efforts can be dampened (Burkart, 
Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997). Binder Hamlyn (1994)
4 undertook a study of the difference between 
the performance of family firms and their non-family counterparts. The data set included 667 
private unquoted firms in the UK over a six year time period (1988-1993). These firms had 
sales  revenue  between  £2.5  and  £25  million.  The  sales  growth  and  average  absolute 
employment growth is higher for the non-family firms than the family-firms. In fact, the sales 
growth of non-family firms is four times higher than family firms.  
 
Family firms have a host of specific characteristics, which adds a different dimension to their 
business  ethics.  Feelings  of  altruism  and  trust  unite  the  family  and  help  in  minimizing 
monitoring costs as well as the need for performance-related rewards (Chami, 1999). Emotional 
pressures rather than the financial pressures, which usually need to be in place to motivate non-
family workers and management, drive the efforts of family members and their managers. This 
same unique family tie helps in reducing the agency costs of the firm. Ang, Cole & Lin (2000) 
studied the agency costs of firms with different ownership and management structures. They 
found that agency costs are higher when managed by an outsider compared to firms with insider 
management and this agency cost reduces with greater management shareholding. Demsetz & 
Lehn  (1985)  note  that  large  concentrated  investors  may  have  economic  incentives  to  curb 
agency problems and thereby maximize firm value. This is because their wealth is so closely 
                                                           
4 As reported in Westhead, P. and Cowling, M. (1997), ‘Performance Contrasts between Family and Non-family Unquoted 
Companies in the UK’, International Journal of Entrepreneurship Behaviour and Research 3, 30-52. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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related to the future viability of the business that monitoring can ensure the growth of their 
income.  
These agency costs are also reduced because family firms aim to pass on their wealth to the 
next generation (Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2003). The need to secure the future of the family 
will ensure that the right investment strategies are undertaken. Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 
(1997) present the stewardship theory whereby managers who associate their well-being and 
success  with  that  of  their  firm  will  act  like  natural  stewards,  i.e.  protecting  the  company’s 
interests and solving organizational problems swiftly to ensure maximum value growth. Family 
members active in management will feel obligated to ensure that the business is successful and 
will continue to generate income for future generation. A number of family firms have very 
clear ideas of their business goals, objectives and the needs of their firm. This can sometimes 
give them a competitive edge (Westhead 2003). Bjuggren & Sund (2001) found that one of the 
advantages of the tradition of passing on the business to the next generation is the use of the 
‘idiosyncratic  knowledge’  gathered  by  the  family  over  the  year  for  the  firms  benefit.  The 
advantage with family firms also lies in their long-term presence in a business. Stein (1988, 
1989)  found  that  managers  suffer  from  ‘myopia’,  which  hinders  the  progress  of  the  firm 
because good long-term projects may be neglected. However, family firms intend to be present 
in the business for generations thus allowing the development of sound relationships with all 
stakeholders as well as ensuring the adoption of good long-term investment projects. Anderson 
et. al. (2002) found that family firms were able to access cheaper debt because of this long-term 
commitment to the business. This feature allows for beneficial relationships to develop with 
suppliers and providers because of the interaction over a long period of time unlike non-family 
management that lasts for short-durations. 
The aim of this paper is to see if these benefits and losses created by the unique governance and 
organisational set up of family firms translate into the returns of these firms. Also it is important 
to determine what structural characteristic differences between family and non-family firms’ 
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3: DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1: The Sample  
 
The criterion for identifying the family firms is broadly based on Shanker and Astrachans’ 
(1996) ‘Middle’ definition of a family firm. The main criterion was that the family should be 
able to exert control on the board, i.e. through their involvement in management, and also have 
a substantial stake in the firm as a shareholder. We therefore classify a family firm as a firm 
where the family shareholding is 3% or above with at least one family member on the board. 
We find that the two types of family firms are usually founder or descendent(s) - run family 
firms and multi-founder established firms.  
   
Data on family firms in the UK have been collected manually from various sources like the 
Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbooks and Incorporation documents obtained from Companies 
House,  Cardiff.  These  have  been  supplemented  by  using  the  biographies  of  directors  from 
Hemscott Academic Guru and Mint to identify the family members. This is to ensure that the 
firms are influenced by family factors that may lead to the benefits and costs mentioned earlier 
influencing the financial and operating policies of the firm. This process gave us 199 family 
firms. Of these, 55 firms are part of the FTSE All Share index, 82 firms are listed on AIM and 
the remaining 56 firms are in the Fledgling index
5.  
 
In order to make a comparison of returns between family and non-family firms we need a 
matched sample of non-family firms. Our match criteria are stock market index (i.e. FTSE All 
Share, Fledgling and AIM)
6, sector and firm size based on natural logarithm of total assets. We 
found matches for 152 family firms making the final matched sample of non-family and family 
firms 304. The average difference in size
7 is 0.49%. The median difference is –0.12% and the 
standard deviation is 8.89%.  
 
Our aim is to discover whether there are any return differences between family and non-family 
firms and whether these can be attributed to some specific characteristics of these firms. Table 1 
presents the returns from the family firms and non-family firms for the full sample as well as 
                                                           
5 Some of the family firms exist in other Indices  
6 The other firms were listed on different Indices like the Techmark All Share ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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their returns within various indices (i.e. FTSE All Share, AIM and Fledgling). The returns were 
constructed on a portfolio basis where the family firms and non-family firms were considered 
as separate portfolios. What the figures indicate is a simple return from an investment of £100 
in these portfolios over a year, 2 years, 3 years up to 5 years. For example if we invested a £100 
in a family firm portfolio we would get £5.74 back as return for the 1
st year and a total
8 return 
of £112.57 if you held it over the entire 5 years
9. Comparing that with the non-family firms we 
see that the same investment of £100 in the non-family firms’ portfolio will give a total return 
of £101.64 and £102.7, if you held it over a single year and five years respectively. Now these 
returns in the real world, where we have transaction costs, would not lead to any real major 
returns. However, what it does tell us is that the returns of family firms over the short-term and 
the long run seem to be higher than non-family firms over 2000 to 2005. Though when we look 
at the individual indices differences between family and non-family firms we find that over the 
short-term non-family firms on the FTSE All Share give back a return higher than family firms 
but is reversed if we hold on to them over 4-5 years. The same is however not true for the 
family and non-family firms on the Fledgling and AIM index. We find that over the first year 
the family firms will give better returns/losses than their non-family counterparts. Over the long 
run the firms on Fledgling will give a total return of £112.92 and the AIM family firms give a 
total return of £123.36 for an investment of £100 in the family portfolios in these indices in the 
beginning  of  2000.  The  difference  between  the  FTSE  All  Share  family  firms  and  the 
Fledgling/AIM family firms may be important as there are several characteristic differences and 
the expectations of the market differ for these classes of firms. The FTSE All Share represents 
98-99% of firms in the UK and is an amalgamation of firms on the FTSE 100, FTSE 350 & 
FTSE Small Cap. We have only 55 family firms on this Index compared to the 82 AIM family 
firms, representing the fact that family firms seem to exist more in growth sectors and are also 








                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 The difference in size is calculated by taking (1- size of family firm/ size of non-family firm). 
8 ‘Total’ return here refers to the original investment of £100 as well as the return over the specified period 
9 It should be noted here that the low returns over the 5 year period are caused by negative returns in the 2nd and 3rd years ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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Table 1: Return characteristics of the different portfolios 
 
Year  FTSE 
FF 








FULL FF  FULL NF 
                 
1 year  2.58%  6.16%  -1.29%  -3.01%  18.9%  7.81%  5.74%  1.64% 
2 years  -1.45%  7.24%  -5.83%  -4.64%  -13.27%  -9.02%  -5.59%  -0.79% 
3 years  -6.31%  -4.87%  2.43%  -4.3%  -12.26%  -26.54%  -5.57%  -7.15% 
4 years  20.43%  17.2%  40.1%  6.99%  50.39%  49.37%  33.17%  15.77% 
5 years  6.71%  -2.46%  12.92%  4.87%  23.36%  9.35%  12.57%  2.7% 
                 
 
 
We use a portfolio approach and calculate risk-adjusted performance measurements, such as 
Sharpe and Treynor ratio, which are used frequently by fund managers. The Sharpe ratio is 
computed by dividing the excess returns on the family and non-family portfolios in each of the 
indices by their total risk (i.e. both the systematic and unsystematic risks). Usually this ratio is 
evaluated against a benchmark to determine if a portfolio has outperformed the market. The 
Treynor  ratio  uses  the  same  principal  calculation  but  uses  the  beta  risk  of  a  firm  as  the 
denominator.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the Sharpe ratio for the family and non-family portfolios for each 
of the indices. The point of this ratio is to determine that in the presence of a risk measurement 
whether these portfolios behave differently. We find that the Sharpe ratio for the FTSE family 
firms is low in the 1
st year, negative in the second and third and then finally positive in the last 
two years. In the FTSE non-family firm portfolio we find positive returns in the first two years 
and the last two years and only one year of negative returns for year 3 which are lower than the 
negative return of the family firm portfolio in that year. It would seem that in the FTSE All 
Share over the long term and the short term investment in non-family firms yields a higher 
return. However the opposite is true for the family firm portfolios in the Fledgling. We find that 
studying the Sharpe ratios for all the years reveals that the family firm portfolio gets a greater 
return (or smaller loss) when compared with the non-family portfolio. So in the Fledgling index 
the family firms outperform their non-family counterparts. The AIM Index results are not so 
clear cut as investments in the family firm portfolio in year 1 and 2 earn lower returns/losses 
than the non-family portfolio. However a longer-term investment in family firms in this index 
bares positive and greater returns than the non-family firms in the Index. This is not surprising ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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as the AIM is known for as the growth market and many of the firms are lucrative investments 
for Venture Capitalists, who are known to favour firms with long-term prospects of returns. A 
look at Table 3, which presents the Treynor ratios for all the different portfolios on the Indices, 
helps us derive the same conclusion. On average, long term or short term investments in the 
FTSE All Share should only be made in the non-family firm portfolio while the opposite is true 
for the Fledgling Index. On the AIM only long-term investments of 4-5 years in family firms 
gives a positive return.  
 
Table 2: Sharpe Ratio of the different portfolios 
 
Year  FTSE 
FF 
FTSE NF  FLEDG 
FF 
FLEDG NF  AIM 
FF 
AIM NF 
             
1 year  0.289  0.508  -1.314  -2.107  2.263  2.677 
2 years  -1.138  0.500  -2.323  -3.726  -2.780  -1.914 
3 years  -2.851  -2.330  -1.049  -2.484  -2.741  -3.446 
4 years  3.266  2.891  3.799  1.258  2.760  1.337 
5 years  1.204  1.794  1.176  0.414  0.446  -0.338 
             
 
Table 3: - Treynor Ratio for the different portfolios 
 
Year  FTSE 
FF 




AIM FF  AIM NF 
             
1 year  0.023  0.039  -0.09485  -0.16473  0.176479  0.286617 
2 years  -0.089  0.039  -0.16767  -0.29131  -0.21682  -0.20498 
3 years  -0.223  -0.179  -0.07569  -0.1942  -0.21374  -0.36885 
4 years  0.255  0.223  0.274119  0.098349  0.215269  0.143135 
5 years  0.094  0.138  0.084846  0.032395  0.034791  -0.03619 
             
 
 
3.2: The trading strategy tested on Asset Pricing models 
 
What could be a reason for these return differences? Return differences between firms have 
been attributed to various factors like size, book-to-market equity, momentum, beta, E/P ratio, 
D/Y ratios, debt-to-equity ratio and corporate governance. Could some of the return differences 
mentioned above be also attributed to the financial and operational policies of family firms? We 
use some well-known models like the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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model to test this. We build a zero-cost portfolio by buying the family firms and selling the 
non-family firms of the different indices. This means that we have 3 different portfolios for the 
FTSE All Share, FTSE Fledgling and the FTSE AIM firms. And we run the following equations 
on these portfolios: 
 
CAPM: Rt = α + β Rm                   (1) 
Fama-French model: Rt = α + β1 SMB+ β2 HML+ β3 Rm        (2) 




Rt  - represents the monthly excess return differences between the family and 
non-family firms in our zero-cost portfolio  
α  - is the abnormal monthly returns from the zero-cost portfolio of buying 
family firms and selling short non-family firms 
SMB  - represents the portfolio mimicking the monthly return differences between 
the smallest and the biggest firms in the sample based on the Fama-French 
approach 
HML  - represents the portfolio, mimicking the monthly return difference between 
the highest 30% BE/ME and the lowest 30% BE/ME firms in the sample 
based on Fama-French approach 
Rm  - is the portfolio of the monthly return differences of the market returns and 
the risk-free rate (i.e. 3-month t-bill rate) for the sample 
Momentum  -  is  the  portfolio  formed  by  taking  the  difference  between  an  equally-
weighted  average  of  firms  with  the  highest  30%  eleven-month  returns 
lagged one month and the lowest 30% eleven-month returns lagged one 
month  
Thus the ‘α’ in these models will represent the abnormal returns in excess of what could be 
gained if we made passive investments in the factors mentioned above. There is a lot of debate 
as to whether the Fama-French and Carhart factor models are representative of risk but we do 
not  take  any  stand  on  this  issue  and  use  them  as  models  to  determine  the  performance 
differences between family and non-family firms. We also take the family and non-family firms ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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of  the  three  different  indices  separately  as  we  have  found  that  the  returns  in  these  indices 
behave differently.  
 
The Fama & French and Carhart models use the SMB, HML, Rm and momentum factors to 
explain the cross-sectional variation in the average stock returns of firms. Taking the average 
values of the factors mentioned above we can evaluate the average risk premiums for these 
factors in a time-series approach to asset-pricing tests. Table 2 presents the mean returns and 
standard deviation for the three different indices. The average values of SMB for the three 
indices are extremely low ranging from –0.018% per month to 0.005% per month. The low 
mean returns indicate that for this sample of firms the SMB factor will not help in explaining 
much cross-sectional variation. The same goes for the average risk premiums for HML, which 
range between –0.009% per month to 0.005% per month. The fact that both the factors are less 
than 2 standard errors between 0 means that the returns are volatile and not reliably different 
from 0. This might not affect the power of the tests, as the common factors in returns will 
absorb most of the variations in stock returns. The average premiums for Rm are also trivial as 
they range from –0.019% per month to 0.016% per month for the three indices. The volatility 
however is extremely high and the average returns are less than 0.3 standard errors from 0, 
which means that the hypothesis that the mean returns are statistically different from 0 cannot 
be rejected. So we see that the Fama-French factors as such do not provide the best explanation 
of the cross-sectional variation in the returns in this sample. However the Rm factor for the 
FTSE sample of firms has a small return of 0.016% per month but is 1.99 standard errors from 
0 and also has a low volatility, which indicates that market factors exert some influence on the 
cross-sectional  variation  of  returns  for  the  FTSE  firms.  The  momentum  factor  has  a  high 
average premium for all the indices where all the returns are above 1% a month and they are all 
15 standard errors away from 0. This makes the past returns of firms an important factor in 







 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
Copyright © 2006 Mukherjee and Padgett.    20 
   
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the returns on the 3 Indices 
 
  Mean returns  ST. DEV  T-STATS 
       
AIMSMB  -0.0179  0.2239  -0.62 
AIMHML  -0.0641  0.3364  -1.48 
AIMRMRF  -0.0188  4.3377  -0.03 
AIMMOM  1.1161  0.3522  24.55 
       
FTSESMB  -0.0199  0.0979  -1.58 
FTSEHML  -0.0091  0.1299  -0.54 
FTSERMRF  0.0160  0.0622  1.99 
FTSEMOM  1.0714  0.4488  18.49 
       
FLEDGSMB  0.0052  0.2103  0.19 
FLEDGHML  0.0045  0.2439  0.14 
FLEDGRMRF  0.0036  0.1223  0.23 
FLEDGMOM  1.2541  0.5854  16.59 
       
 
Table 4 presents the correlation between the various factors on the three different indices. The 
Fama-French and Carhart models validate the use of these factors by observing a low correlation 
between them, which represents the fact that they will explain different elements of the cross-
sectional stock returns. We find the correlation between SMB, HML and Rm is extremely high. 
This suggests that they are probably accounting for similar factors for the excess returns of our 
family vs. non-family zero-investment strategy. Only the momentum factor seems to have a low 
correlation with all the other factors therefore it would separately explain a part of the cross-
section variations in returns. However, the high correlation between SMB, HML and Rm will not 
affect the 'α’ of our models. We do not need to evaluate the individual contributions of these 
factors to the cross-sectional variation of excess returns but require evaluating whether the zero-
investment strategy can produce abnormal returns beyond passive investment in these factor-
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Table 5: Correlation of the different factor mimicking portfolios 
 
  AIMSMB  AIMHML  AIMRMRF  AIMMOM 
AIMSMB  1.00  0.822  -0.326  -0.043 
AIMHML  0.822  1.00  -0.182  0.068 
AIMRMRF  -0.326  -0.182  1.00  0.006 
AIMMOM  -0.043  0.068  0.006  1.00 
 
  FTSESMB  FTSEHML  FTSERMRF  FTSEMOM 
FTSESMB  1.00  0.822  -0.868  -0.082 
FTSEHML  0.822  1.00  -0.645  -0.079 
FTSERMRF  -0.868  -0.645  1.00  -0.006 
FTSEMOM  -0.082  -0.079  -0.006  1.00 
 
  FLEDGSMB  FLEDGHML  FLEDGRMRF  FLEDGMOM 
FLEDGSMB  1.00  0.941  -0.960  0.155 
FLEDGHML  0.941  1.00  -0.883  0.150 
FLEDGRMRF  -0.960  -0.883  1.00  -0.210 
FLEDGMOM  0.155  0.150  -0.210  1.00 
 
The next 3 tables present the results of the Weighted-Least Square estimates of the equations 
represented by the 3 models. Table 5 presents the CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart model for 
all the FTSE All Share family and non-family firms in the sample. We have the excess returns 
of a zero-investment portfolio, where we buy all the family firms and sell short all non-family 
firms. This makes the value of ‘α’ our main focus, as it will tell us the abnormal profits we can 
earn  if  we  follow  this  strategy.  It  is  the  excess  returns  that  we  can  achieve  whilst  making 
passive investments in the size, book-to-market, market and momentum factors. This is a test to 
see if investing in family firms could afford any kind of return advantage. The Fama and French 
model  predicts  that  the  intercepts  should  not  be  significant  if  the  zero-investment  factor-
mimicking portfolio’s can explain all the variations in returns. But we find that for the Fama & 
French and Carhart model there is a positive and significant intercept. This means that there is 
some abnormal profit to be made. The Fama-French model ‘α’ gives us a .97%
10 return per 
month, which gives us an annualised return of 11.6% on the FTSE All Share Index. The Carhart 
model  gives  us  an  abnormal  profit  of  2.05%  per  month,  which  is  an  annualised  return  of 
24.65% per month. Looking at the other factors, SMB and HML, also seem to be significant 
and explain a large part of the return variations but we cannot really use these figures because 
of the high correlation between these factors. We however do find that that both the Rm and the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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Momentum effects are not significant. We find that the R
2 ’ s are marginally better for the 
Fama-French and the Carhart models compared to the one-factor CAPM model.     
 
Table 6: CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart model results for FTSE All Share Index 
 
FTSERET  ALPHA  FTSESMB  FTSEHML  FTSERMRF  FTSEMOM  R
2  S(e) 
               
CAPM  -0.0062***      -0.212204    0.15  0.18 
               
F-F 
MODEL 
0.00974**  0.71118***  -0.22988***  0.075432    0.39  0.075 
               
CARHART 
MODEL 
0.02054**  0.70349***  -0.24074***  0.09014  -0.0114  0.398  0.076 
For the three models on the Fledgling Index we find positive significant intercepts. The Fama-
French model gives us an abnormal return of 2.56% per month and an annualised return of 
30.72%. The Carhart model, which adds the Momentum factor, gives us a higher abnormal 
return (i.e. 3.74% per month and 44.93% per year) on our zero-investment strategy. We find 
that the Fama- French and Carhart models fit better than the CAPM and can explain most of the 
variation in returns. The slopes of the factor mimicking portfolios on size, book-to-market and 
the market are significant. However this is mainly due to the high correlation between the 
factors and therefore we cannot properly interpret their effects.  
 
TABLE 7: CAPM, FAMA-FRENCH AND CARHART MODEL RESULTS FOR FLEDGLING INDEX 
 
FLEDGRET  ALPHA  FLEDGSMB  FLEDGHML  FLEDGRMRF  FLEDGMOM  R
2  S(e) 
               
CAPM  0.01677*** 
 
 
    -0.14143*    0.035  0.036 
               
F-F MODEL  0.02560***  -0.51342***  0.67726***  0.260140**    0.99  0.02 
               
CARHART 
MODEL 
0.03744***  -0.46005***  0.639398***  0.2775532**  -0.007085  0.99  0.014 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 Note that the units of the returns were not originally in percentage.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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The next table presents the results of similar empirical applications on the AIM listed sample of 
firms. We find that the R
2 ’s are stronger for the Fama-French and Carhart models. We also find 
that the intercept for the Fama-French model is positive and strong and we get a monthly return 
of  0.84%  and  an  annualised  return  of  10.07%.  However,  with  the  Carhart  model  and  the 
addition  of  the  Momentum  effect  we  have  quite  a  different  result,  as  the  intercept  is  now 
negative and significant. If we recall the definition of the ‘α’ (i.e. it is the excess return we can 
earn from our strategy compared to the zero-investment factor mimicking portfolios) this result 
is interesting. This means that in a growth market like the AIM we find that a strategy of 
buying past winners and selling past losers gives us a positive return of 4.55% per month and 
54.62% per year. None of the other indices have a similar momentum effect. With the addition 
of  the  Momentum  factor  we  find  that  we  get  an  abnormal  loss  from  our  zero-investment 
strategy of buying the family firms on the AIM and selling short the non-family firms on the 
same  index.  These  firms  are  generally  in  the  services  or  technology  sectors  making  these 
essentially growth firms. This could be potentially important for investors in this index. 
 
TABLE 8: CAPM, FAMA-FRENCH AND CARHART MODEL RESULTS FOR AIM INDEX 
 
AIMRET  ALPHA  AIMSMB  AIMHML  AIMRMRF  AIMMOM  R
2  S(e) 
               
CAPM  0.01464*** 
 
 
    -0.20019***    0.69  0.074 
               
F-F MODEL  0.00839**  -0.44440***  0.37526***  -0.459130    0.79  0.06 
               
CARHART 
MODEL 
-0.0364***  0.73479***  -0.451348**  0.085969  0.045516***  0.89  0.04 
               
 
Section 3.4: Which Asset Pricing model is better for the zero-investment strategy? 
 
We find that in Table 6, 7 and 8 that the three models – CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart – 
have significant intercepts and apart from the CAPM have close R
2 values. This makes it quite 
difficult to evaluate which model is better. We are going to use Chen’s (1983) methodology to ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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test  the  Fama-French  and  Carhart  model
11  against  the  CAPM.  If  the  CAPM  were  not 
misspecified then the residual of the CAPM equation would represent noise and have a zero 
mean across time. However if it is misspecified then we would find that the slope of the CAPM 
would not capture all the information and that the residual would no longer act as a noise across 
time and would capture some of the missing information. If there were a model that could price 
the remaining part of the returns then we would find that that model could price the CAPM 
residual. So the test uses Weighted-Least Square estimates of the CAPM residuals as dependent 
variable and the various factors of the Fama-French and Carhart model as the independent 
variables. It is important to keep in mind that only those factors used in the WLS estimates of 
the models before (i.e. those in Table 6, 7 and 8) should be used. The correlation
12 between the 
CAPM residual, which has a market factor that shows up in the other two models as well, will 
not lead to spurious results as they are perfectly correlated by definition of the factor. We need 
to study tables 6, 7 and 8 and the results below to be able to make a proper assessment. We 
need to check that the same factors are still significant with the same sign and roughly the same 
magnitude. This together with the individual t-statistics and the F-statistic will help determine 
whether the CAPM is misspecified and whether the 2 models are able to correct it. Though we 
are not directly comparing the two models – Fama-French and Carhart – we may find that 
compared to the CAPM one of the models is better suited for a particular index. We find in the 
FTSE All Share that the CAPM is misspecified and it is picked up by both the models. The 
conclusion has been drawn from a comparison of the various model factors between Table 6 
and Table 9.  We find that all the factors that are significant have the same sign and roughly the 
same  magnitude  in  both  the  tables.  The  F-statistic is  significant  at  1%  and  shows  that  the 
pricing is not by chance. An observation of Table 10 however seems to show that the Fledgling 
index is better priced by the Fama -French model. The addition of the momentum factor in the 
Carhart model does not pick up the CAPM misspecification and it is better priced using the 
Fama-French 3-factor model. Table 11 on the AIM listed firm’s shows us that the momentum 
factor in the Carhart model captures the misspecification of the CAPM better than the Fama-
French model. In both the cases we find that one of the factors namely the intercept behaves 
differently from the original results (i.e. results on table 7 & 8). This tells us that the momentum 
                                                           
11 Comparing the Fama-French model and Carhart model using the Chen methodology is not possible as both the models have 
very similar factors except for the momentum factor. So the results could be spurious.  
12 According to Chen (1983) if the factors on two models are perfectly correlated then they will not suffer. However if they are 
less than perfectly correlated then the market factor from the CAPM could have affected a spurious result on the correlated 
market factor of the two other models. However, as the market factor is the same in all the models they are all perfectly correlated 
and will not suffer statistically.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
Copyright © 2006 Mukherjee and Padgett.    25 
   
factor in the Fledgling Index does not add any significance to the pricing of returns and the 
opposite is true for the AIM listed firms. So the results of the Carhart model are the best for the 
AIM firm and the Fama-French model and the Fama-French model for the Fledgling firms.   
 
Table 9: 
Regression of Residuals 
 
capmresidftse= b0 + b1 ftsesmb + b2 ftsehml + b3 ftsermrf 





ALPHA  FTSESMB  FTSEHML  FTSERMRF  FTSEMOM  F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
             
bI  0.01566* 
 
 
0.79581*  -0.22106*  0.31342    0.0001 
t-stat  3.4845 
 
 









ALPHA  FTSESMB  FTSEHML  FTSERMRF  FTSEMOM  F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
             
bI  0.024337* 
 
 
0.789634*  -0.229786*  0.325241  -0.009162  0.0002 
t-stat  2.379754 
 
 
2.997360  -5.202355  1.699974  -0.944842   
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Table 10: 
Regression of Residuals 
 
capmresidfledg = b0 + b1 fledgsmb + b2 fledghml + b3 fledgrmrf  















             
bi  0.01153* 
 
 
-0.402251*  0.662393*  0.479135*    0.0000 
t-stat  2.01105 
 
 














             
bi  0.018225 
 
 
-0.372080*  0.640989*  0.487836*  -0.004005  0.0000 
t-stat  1.466035 
 
 
-2.982819  5.502889  3.812607  -0.607699   
 
Table 11: 
Regression of Residuals 
 
capmresidaim = b0 + b1 aimsmb + b2 aimhml + b3 aimrmrf + b4 aimmom 




ALPHA  AIMSMB  AIMHML  AIMRMRF  AIMMOM  F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
             
bI  -0.01778* 
 
 
-0.55558*  0.288651*  -0.506247    0.0000 
t-stat  -4.847984 
 
 
-6.624139  5.691074  -1.376519     
Residual from 
CR model 
ALPHA  AIMSMB  AIMHML  AIMRMRF  AIMMOM  F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
             
bI  -0.05953* 
 
 
0.54323*  -0.48161*  0.001696  0.04241*  0.0000 
t-stat  -9.19729 
 
 
3.257766  -4.193024  0.006104  7.083918   
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4: WHAT FACTORS LEAD TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE INDICES RETURN BEHAVIOUR? 
When we use the Fama-French and Carhart models to ascertain if any financial advantage could 
be achieved from trading family firms and non-family firms, we find that the AIM listed firms, 
in the presence of momentum, behaved differently from the rest of the Indices. The momentum 
factor on the AIM gives a higher return than the zero-investment strategy of buying the family 
portfolio and selling short the non-family portfolio. This leads to the conclusion that buying 
past winners and selling short past losers is a better trading strategy on the AIM than on the 
FTSE All Share or the Fledgling. The intrinsic nature of the firms on these indices may cause 
the  difference,  as  growth  firms  mainly  dominate  the  AIM.  An  investigation  into  the  basic 
characteristic  differences  between  the  three  indices  may  go  some  way  in  explaining  the 
different results. We also find that for the FTSE All Share and the Fledgling Indices our zero-
investment strategy earned substantial abnormal profits. This validates a further study into the 
exact return characteristics of family and non-family firms that drive these results. 
We  use  the  factors  in  the  Haugen  Model  (1996)  to  help  determine  the  components  most 
important to the returns of a firm. If markets were perfectly liquid and efficient, then dissimilar 
risk  factors  alone  would  determine  differences  in  expected  returns.  However,  if  there  are 
liquidity differences or if the present information set leads to biased pricing of the stocks, then 
several non-risk related factors could be used to predict the cross-sectional return of firms. The 
Haugen  model  predicts  five  classes  of  factors  that  could  have  an  impact  on  returns:  risk, 
liquidity, price-level, growth potential and price-history. Each of these classes has a number of 
sub-factors used by the model to determine the payoffs of the firms. The model then uses these 
payoffs to determine appropriate trading strategies. Our objective here is not to determine the 
true  payoffs  for  family  and  non-family  firms  but  to  select  appropriate  factors  that  have  an 
influence on returns and use this information to see which characteristics help drive the returns 
for particular types of firms. Therefore we have not used all the factors that the Haugen model 
uses to calculate these payoffs. Another reason for not using all the sub-factors in each category 
is the unavailability of the data on some of these factors for the entire sample period.  
 
The factors related to risk are Debt-Equity ratio and Times Interest Earned (TIE). These were 
chosen as opposed to Beta values because empirical evidence has sometimes found the CAPM 
beta lacking in capturing the risk element of the firm. The risk element is related to the amount 
of debt the firm is taking on as this will increase the chances of default and also means that the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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shareholders of the firm will be further at risk of not recovering their investment incase of 
bankruptcy.  So it would be expected that an increase in the debt-equity ratio would lead to 
greater risk and require greater returns to compensate for the added risk. Times Interest Earned 
is calculated by taking the EBIT (i.e. Earnings before tax and interest) and dividing that by the 
total interest charges of the firm. This ratio is important to judge whether the company has a 
healthy income to pay off all its debt obligations. It relates information regarding the number of 
times a firm has the resources to cover its interest charges on a pre tax basis. This ratio can give 
an indication of bankruptcy. So as the ratio increases it will reduce the risks related to interest 
rate fluctuations. If it is a true risk related variable then it should lead to a reduction of the 
returns of the firm as lower risk leads to lower returns. So we expect a negative relation: as the 
TIE ratio increases the risk reduces and the returns will no longer need to have a risk premium 
component.  
 
Liquidity of a stock is important as a trader must buy stocks at the ask price and sell at the bid 
prices. This bid-ask spread is taken as the cost of trading. Stoll & Whaley (1983) and Amihud 
& Mendelson (1986) point out that to maintain the rate of expected returns, net of trading costs, 
it is important to ensure that the gross expected returns reflect this cost of trading. The variable 
we use to represent liquidity is trading volume as a proportion of the market capitalisation of 
the firm.  Liquidity variables as such should be negative, as more liquid stocks will end up 
having higher overall costs of trading. Thus the gross returns should be low to reflect this higher 
trading cost.  
Price-level variables help to judge the current stock prices in relation to various accounting 
variables. These ratios usually help us in discovering whether a particular stock is selling cheap 
or dear. We use the Book to Market Price (BM) as a representative of price-level variables that 
affect returns of a firm. The Fama and French model explains the relative return differences 
between  ‘value’  and  ‘growth’  firms.  Growth  (Value)  firms  will  tend  have  lower  (higher) 
returns. The rationale is that value stocks are ‘fallen angels’ and require higher returns for the 
increased  risk.  The  other  school  of  thought  is  that  investors  overreact  to  past  returns,  i.e. 
successes or failures, of a firm and that the usual channels of competition will ensure that the 
firms’ profit will go back to its normal level. Investors can project prolonged growth and drive 
the  prices  of  growth  stock  up.  Usually  investors  are  caught  off  guard  when  the  forces  of ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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competition alter expected return patterns of these growth firms. The future returns from these 
stocks tend to be lower than expected and the opposite is true for value stocks. We also use the 
Dividend Yield variable in this category. An increase in this ratio can be interpreted in two 
ways. A positive impact on returns may mean that the firm has been rewarded for their ability 
to  provide  earnings  over  and  above  their  reinvestment  requirements.  However,  if  it  has  a 
negative impact then the market interprets these dividends as a result of a lack of any other 
fruitful  investment  opportunities  within  the  business.  Therefore  dividend  yield  also  has  a 
signaling effect which helps in determining market reactions.  
Growth potential of a firm will help in evaluating its future prospects, which from an investor’s 
point of view is important. If we assume that the present growth of the firm is sustainable over a 
future period, until the forces of competition bring the prices back to normal, then investors can 
earn a positive return. The factors we use to represent growth are the Return on Asset (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Capital Turnover. ROA is taken as the ratio between operating 
profit and total assets where as the ROE uses total equity as the denominator. The Capital 
Turnover ratio is calculated by dividing total sales by total assets. This ratio helps us to gauge 
how the assets of the firm are being used to generate sales in the firm. The higher the ratio the 
better it is.  
 
Below is a summary of the results from Fama-Macbeth regressions using factors representing 4 
broad categories – Risk, Price, Liquidity & Growth potential – and the returns of the firm as the 
dependant variable. The Fama-Macbeth approach requires running cross-sectional regressions 
with all the variables for each time period and then the time-series coefficient and standard error 
are used to determine the t-statistics for each factor. They are then ranked according to the 
absolute value of their t-statistic. The full cross-sectional regression results for the family firms, 
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Table 12: Factors that drive the returns of family and non-family firms 
 










         
1  RETURN ON 
EQUITY 
 
3.99*  DEBT TO EQUITY  -1.93* 




3  CAPITAL 
TURNOVER 
 
1.34  RETURN ON 
EQUITY 
1.14 




5  DIVIDEND YIELD 
 
-1.02  BOOK TO PRICE  -0.41 
6  BOOK TO PRICE 
 
0.61  DIVIDEND YIELD  0.32 
7  DEBT TO EQUITY 
 
-0.39   VOLUME  -0.24 
8  TIMES INTEREST 
EARNED 




Table 12 above ranks the ‘time-series’ t-statistics for each factor of the family and non-family 
portfolios in our sample. We find that on account of the time-series standard errors being large, 
many of the t-statistics are not significant. However the important result is that we have clearly 
two separate factors that drive the returns of family firms and their non-family counterparts. 
The returns of the family firms in the sample are driven by the growth potential of the firm as 
represented by the ROE and ROA of the firm. Both the factors are positive with the Return on 
Equity being particularly strong. This tells us that the performance and growth opportunity of a 
family firm should be of paramount importance to investors. However, with non-family firms 
we find risk factors such as Debt-Equity ratio and Times Interest Earned seem to be particularly 
important. However, the sign of the Debt-Equity ratio is negative, which means that as debt 
grows in proportion to equity (i.e. risk increases) returns will diminish and vice-versa. The 
usual relationship of risk and return is positive, as higher risk requires greater compensation. 
Here the opposite seems to be working. If we look at the debt-equity ratio for the family firm 
(which is not significant) it has the same negative sign. This may be because this factor (i.e. 
Debt-Equity ratio) may not be an exact measure of risk. It is an accounting figure representing ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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the fact that a company has taken on too much debt compared to its equity levels and the market 
judges it as a risky business. Therefore the market reduces returns to represent the ‘accounting’ 
risk of the firm and warns investors. Traditional risk factors like Beta help us gauge how much 
risk a firms stock has compared to the market. However, accounting figures help to measure 
something much more intrinsic and expose the weakness in the basic finances of a company. 
These issues need to be addressed and probably the markets way to push the company towards 
better  financial  balance  is  to  reduce  returns.  Arditti  (1967)  while  regressing  the  geometric 
average of previous rates of return
13 on the debt-equity ratio of each industry found a negative 
relationship between the two. The expected positive relationship between debt risk and return 
was conspicuously missing in each of his 6 industry categories except ‘Oil’. His explanation for 
the  negative  relationship  was  that  it  was  an  effect  of  ‘omitted’  non-income  information
14. 
Bhandari (1988) found that when controlling for beta and firm size, the expected stock returns 
are positively related to the debt-equity ratio of the firm and that it was not just a ‘risk’ related 
premuim. 
The other risk factor ‘Times-interest Earned’ relates positively to returns. An increase in the 
measure means that the income of the company is better placed to meet its interest obligations. 
So an improvement in the ratio will mean that the financial health of the company is better or 
that the firm is paying off its debt from earnings.  The company is therefore able to cope with 
interest rate fluctuations. The market will perceive this as positive news justifying the positive 
returns. However it is interesting to find that again the risk associated with this ratio, which is 
the interest rate risk, has a different relationship with return. As the ratio increases it is actually 
reducing the firms’ chance of interest payment default and the market should therefore react to 
the reduced risk and lower returns. But this accounting ratio does not have the expected sign. In 
my equivalent family firms we find that the TIE is negative and insignificant. This means that 
the opposite is true for family firms, which is interesting. As the firm is able to pay off more 
and more of its debt obligations they are penalised. This is probably because of the fact that the 
market may not always consider the TIE as a factor reducing the financial burden of a firm. It 
may mean that the firm is wasting the opportunity of using their earnings, which has a low 
capital cost, for investment projects that would yield higher returns than the current high rate of 
interest that the firm would have to carry if they borrowed to expand their business. The fact 
                                                           
13 The geometric mean was taken as a representation of the expected profit rate of a firm. 
14 The analysis already includes all relevant income related information through the three moments of the probability distribution 
of the returns, which are the independent variables in the regression. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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that family firms in general tend to take on more debt, as a ‘safe’ source of financing that does 
not affect their ownership structures makes this finding even more interesting.  
The other insignificant but contrasting result is in relation to dividend yield. As the dividend of 
the firm increases or the share price reduces, for the non-family firms it has a positive impact on 
returns and the opposite effect on family firm returns. Family firms typically have one or more 
shareholders from within the family who are dependent on the firm’s dividend payout as their 
main source of income. However, the market may feel that the retention rate of the firm is lower 
than its peers and in turn reduces its market return. An increase in the BM of the family firms 
(i.e. Book to Price ratio) reveals a positive impact on returns. However the opposite is true for 
the non-family firms. Traditionally we expect a positive relationship between BM and returns 
(Fama & French, 1992). As we are working with a matched sample of family and non-family 
firms the sector growth opportunities are the same. So the difference between the two types of 
firms must be the extent of the growth opportunities. The negative relationship of BM and 
returns  means  that  as  non-family  firms  increase  their  BM  ratio  they  achieve  lower  returns 
meaning that the potential growth of these firms may be stable or non-existent. The positive 
relationship of BM to returns for family firms only emphasises that these firms have a potential 
for rapid growth or have recently exhibited growth prospects. This is supported by the positive 
and significant ‘growth-potential’ related factors (i.e. ROA, ROE and Capital Turnover) for the 
family firms.  
The table below exhibits the t-statistics results from the Fama-Macbeth regressions for each 
Index (i.e. FTSE All Share, Fledgling and AIM). We use the same approach as before, however 
each Index includes both the family and non-family firms in the analysis. The motivation for 
this approach is to evaluate if there are any particular differences between firms in general on 
each Index, which drives some of the results of the factor models used in the above section. 
Here again we find some interesting results.  
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Table 13: Factors that drive the returns of FTSE All Share, Fledgling and AIM firms 
 












             
1  DIVIDEND 
YIELD 
-6.51*  RETURN ON 
ASSET 




2  BOOK TO PRICE  2.12*  DEBT TO 
EQUITY 




3  TRADE VOLUME 
 
-1.43*  RETURN ON  
EQUITY 




4  CAPITAL 
TURNOVER 
1.10  DIVIDEND 
YIELD 




5  RETURN ON 
ASSET 
0.87  CAPITAL 
TURNOVER 




6  RETURN ON 
EQUITY 
0.65  TRADE 
VOLUME 




7  DEBT TO 
EQUITY 




-0.97  TRADE 
VOLUME 
1.08 
8  TIMES INTEREST 
EARNED 






We  focus  first  on  the  FTSE  All  Share  portfolio.  Price-level  factors  and  liquidity  drive  the 
returns of the sample of firms in this index. Price-level factors are supposed to identify the true 
value  of  stocks,  i.e.  determining  whether  they  are cheap  or  dear.  When  the  prices  are  low 
compared to other accounting factors like dividend and book value then we see higher returns. 
Fama and French (1992) found that value stocks are ‘fallen angels’ that need to give higher 
returns to compensate for the risk involved. These premiums are expected and so sometimes 
these factors can be considered to be in the risk category. We see that book value to price 
follows the traditional relationship with returns, i.e. positive, unlike dividend yield. However, 
this result does not hold for the firms on the Fledgling and the AIM indices. They seem to 
exhibit a negative insignificant relationship between BM and returns. Dividend yield (dividend 
to price ratio) is also negative, which means as the dividend yield increases returns for that 
stock decreases.  This could be because dividends can either be interpreted as dispensation of 
company profits in the absence of other investment opportunities or as a positive utilization of ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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firm earnings. If increasing dividends reduces returns, the market associates negativity with this 
type of payment. As we can see is the case for the sample of firms on the FTSE All Share. This 
means that the firms would do better to reinvest these funds into projects that would help to 
increase returns in the future. The other factor important is the Volume of trade or liquidity of 
the FTSE All Share portfolio of firms. The rebalancing of portfolios requires traders to buy at 
the ask price and sell at the bid price. This bid-ask spread is considered as the cost of trading 
and the gross expected returns from a stock should take into account this trading cost. Thus as 
the volume of trade increases, i.e. a stock has higher liquidity, then the gross returns would 
decrease to accommodate for the increased costs of trading. Thus the expected relationship is 
negative which is what we find.  
 
When we look at the results of the time-series t-statistics for AIM and Fledgling we find very 
different  factors  than  the  FTSE  All  Share  Index  that  drive  the  returns.  We  have  2  factors 
representing growth potential and a factor each representing risk and price-level categories. 
When  we  ran  the  Carhart  regressions  on  the  firms  on  the  AIM  we  found  that  the  zero-
investment trading strategy of buying a family firm and selling short a non-family firm portfolio 
gives  a  negative  abnormal  return.  This  is  a  consequence  of  the  addition  of  the  momentum 
factor.  Thus,  the  growth  potentials  of  these  firms  are  important  to  investors.  We  find  that 
Dividend  Yield  of  the  firms  on  the  Fledgling  and  the  AIM  are  negative  which  means  as 
dividend to price ratio rises the returns of the firms reduce. As mentioned above investors can 
read dividends in two different ways. The negative relationship is established because these 
firms can aim for better investment opportunities than sharing their earnings with investors. It is 
not surprising to find this result in a growth market like the AIM because research has shown 
that investors in technology or growth sectors expect reinvestment of earnings and as such are 
willing to sacrifice dividend income for greater capital gains in future. Debt-equity ratio seems 
to be significant though it is negative for both the Indices. Again this might mean that this ratio 
is  not  an  absolute  risk  related  factor.  The  surprising  result  is  the  liquidity  of  the  firms,  as 
represented  by  the  ratio  of  the  trading  volume  and  market  capitalisation,  is  positive  but 
insignificant. The expected relationship would be negative because as the trading costs increase 
we need to ensure that the gross returns are lower so that the expected returns net of trading 
costs  remain  roughly  comparable.  However  the  positive  relationship  highlights  that  these ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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markets are fairly illiquid and an increase in trading activity will lend a hand in spreading the 
costs of trading.  
Table 14: Fama-MacBeth Regression results for sample of firms on Fledgling Index 
FLEDGLING 
FIRMS 
BP  CT  DE  DP  ROA  ROE  TIE  VO 
                 
2000  -15.13  -7.46  -1.98  -5.85  -25.35  0.21  0.05  0.00294** 
  (50.66)  (27.75)  (21.39)  (13.96)  (93.13)  (0.35)  (0.168)  (0.0012) 
2001  -25.42*  12.82**  0.196  4.62  71.19*  0.01  -0.01  -0.00012 
  (6.6)  (5.15)  (2.73)  (3.43)  (16.36)  (0.062)  (0.13)  (0.0002) 
2002  -14.82*  1.75  -3.71  -1.57  78.86*  -0.01*  -0.004  -0.00025* 
  (4.14)  (3.59)  (2.54)  (1.25)  (16.67)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (9.18E -05) 
2003  8.76  29.07***  -0.86  -13.17**  108.33  -0.05  -0.43  0.000609** 
  (7.54)  (14.66)  (0.49)  (6.1)  (65.62)  (0.17)  (0.37)  (0.0003) 
2004  4.52  13.16**  -0.49  -9.44***  156.60**  0.11  0.02  6.95E-06 
  (5.31)  (6.19)  (4.79)  (5.26)  (68.45)  (0.24)  (0.024)  (5.81E-05) 
MEAN  -8.42  9.87*  -1.37*  -5.088*  77.93*  0.05  -0.08  0.00061 
  (6.47)  (6.14)  (0.68)  (3.1)  (29.85)  (0.047)  (0.09)  (0.0006) 
 
 





BP  CT  DE  DP  ROA  ROE  TIE  VO 
                 
2000  -16.6  -2.44  -2.56  -0.04  -15.57  0.083  0.03  0.002** 
  (31.02)  (17.75)  (16.5)  (6.7)  (68.21)  (0.21)  (0.123)  (0.0007) 
2001  -15.83*  7.55**  0.52  0.045  71.71*  0.06  -0.011  -0.0001 
  (4.98)  (3.81)  (2.43)  (1.47)  (14.5)  (0.05)  (0.008)  (0.0001) 
2002  -9.73*  -2.47  -3.99  0.24  95.7*  -0.007  0.0004  -4.9E-05 
  (2.79)  (2.91)  (2.76)  (1.12)  (14.91)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.0001) 
2003  20.9*  27.45*  -1.18  -7.86***  65.59  -0.005  -0.13  0.0005** 
  (7.44)  (7.3)  (1.83)  (4.32)  (43.13)  (0.21)  (0.092)  (0.00021) 
2004  4.27***  7.83  -2.68  -3.89  134.1**  0.26*  -0.02  0.00011 
  (2.46)  (5.66)  (2.37)  (2.99)  (52.69)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.0001) 
MEAN  -3.4  7.59  -1.98*  -2.3*  70.31*  0.08*  -0.03  0.00039 
  (7.13)  (5.46)  (0.77)  (1.59)  (24.61)  (0.049)  (0.03)  (0.0003) 
 
 




BP  CT  DE  DP  ROA  ROE  TIE  VO 
                 
2000  18.34***  4.07  2.29  -5.37***  45.27  -0.01  -0.0011  1.68E-07 
  (10.66)  (7.43)  (4.9)  (3.001)  (71.53)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (3.07E-05) 
2001  4.86  23.8*  -10.26  -2.74  -8.75  -0.157**  0.024**  -6.23E-05 
  (11.16)  (7.03)  (14.98)  (1.94)  (43.42)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.0004) 
2002  3.17  -11.4*  -2.66  -2.47***  30.8  0.44*  0.021*  -1.83E-05* 
  (5.04)  (4.11)  (1.62)  (1.25)  (54.77)  (0.115)  (0.007)  (2.39E-06) 
2003  9.7  17.34***  23.93*  -4.96  280.32*  -0.25  -0.05  8.77E-06 
  (13.69)  (9.29)  (6.42)  (4.3)  (104.8)  (0.36)  (0.03)  (1.46E-05) 
2004  44.93**  0.44  -3.98  -3.46  -82.22  0.47  0.008  -0.00019 
  (22.12)  (13.44)  (18.08)  (6.9)  (217.44)  (1.04)  (0.006)  0.0005 
MEAN  16.19*  6.85  1.86  -3.8*  53.09  0.098  0.0012  -5.23E-05* 
  (7.65)  (6.24)  (5.87)  (0.58)  (60.96)  (0.151)  (0.013)  (0.0003) ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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BP  CT  DE  DP  ROA  ROE  TIE  VO 
                 
2000  -3.22**  2.51  -35.4*  2.34*  -22.28**  0.143***  0.041**  -0.0012 
  (1.55)  (2.64)  (8.84)  (0.122)  (10.46)  (0.085)  (0.019)  (0.0026) 
2001  -5.23  1.1  -1.96  -0.57  45.99**  0.253**  -0.002  -7.69E-05* 
  (5.12)  (3.17)  (4.13)  (1.32)  (21.49)  (0.116)  (0.005)  (2.78E-05) 
2002  -6.92**  -3.57  -1.07  0.57  68.91*  0.395*  -0.006  -5.93E-05** 
  (2.93)  (2.68)  (2.91)  (1.08)  (21.73)  (0.108)  (0.003)  (2.60E-05) 
2003  27.23*  28.76*  13.8**  -5.18  4.43  0.116  -0.028  3.73E-05 
  (8.29)  (6.21)  (6.25)  (3.46)  (58.92)  (0.47)  (0.033)  (3.38E-05) 
2004  7.59  9.08**  7.94*  -4.69*  135.21*  0.136  -0.016  -2.49E-06 
  (5.76)  (4.44)  (2.61)  (2.01)  (49.31)  (0.088)  (0.013)  (8.18E-06) 
MEAN  3.89  7.58  -3.34  -1.51  46.45*  0.21*  -0.001  -0.0003 
  (6.36)  (5.67)  (8.53)  (1.48)  (27.27)  (0.052)  (0.012)  (0.00024) 
 
 






BP  CT  DE  DP  ROA  ROE  TIE  VO 
                 
2000  1.65  1.34  0.61  -1.78  -33.85  -0.007  0.065***  3.61E-06 
  (10.28)  (5.95)  (2.76)  (2.32)  (46.83)  (0.016)  (0.034)  (2.27E-05) 
2001  -16.21*  10.62*  -1.59  1.13  77.76*  0.004  0.002  -8.23E-06 
  (5.28)  (3.79)  (2.55)  (1.55)  (23.05)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (1.20E-05) 
2002  -6.29***  -7.46**  -1.48  -0.84  85.51*  -0.002  0.002  -1.83E-05** 
  (3.53)  (2.98)  (1.92)  (0.99)  (17.23)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (7.17E-06) 
2003  9.82  26.59*  -0.95  -3.51  41.63  0.04  0.022  2.61E-05 
  (6.47)  (6.41)  (1.49)  (2.59)  (35.59)  (0.17)  (0.052)  (1.50E-
05)*** 
2004  1.9  -1.03  -4.38  8.35  -149.48  0.29  0.016  -1.25E-05 
  (9.64)  (11.43)  (8.11)  (7.35)  (95.58)  (0.29)  (0.04)  (2.50E-05) 
MEAN  -1.83  6.01  -1.56*  0.67  4.31  0.064  0.021*  -1.9E-06 
  (4.41)  (5.91)  (0.81)  (2.06)  (43.87)  (0.056)  (0.012)  (7.86E-06) 
 
5: CONCLUSION 
The aim of the paper is to understand the return differences of family and non-family firms and 
evaluate if some financial advantage can be gained. The characteristics of a family firm set 
them apart from non-family firms. The costs and benefits usually associated with family firms 
are part of their operations and might influence their returns. We set up a zero-cost trading 
strategy of buying the family firm portfolio and selling short the non-family firm portfolio. We 
use  three  different  asset  pricing  models  to  test  if  this  strategy  give  us  an  abnormal  profit 
compared  to  the  portfolios  mimicking  beta  risk,  size,  book  to  market,  market  return  and ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-11 
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momentum. On setting out the model we find there is a high correlation between the size, book 
to market and market return mimicking portfolios. Therefore the results of these three factors in 
the regression cannot be analysed independently. The momentum factor however has very low 
correlation with other factors. A study of the mean returns of the portfolios of these factors 
reveals that momentum on the three indices is a profitable strategy. 
Using this methodology revealed that for the FTSE All Share and Fledgling firms an abnormal 
profit  could  be  achieved.  This  reveals  that  there  is  some  premium  attached  to  family  firm 
returns compared to non-family firms. On the AIM Index however we find that in the presence 
of the momentum factor-mimicking portfolio we get an abnormal loss from the strategy. This 
clearly shows that on the AIM a strategy of buying past winners and selling short past losers is 
a better strategy. However, most of the results were obtained without taking into consideration 
transaction costs. Therefore this strategy, i.e. as a trading strategy, may not be successful in the 
presence of costs.  
 
To  evaluate  which  firm  characteristics  actually  drive  these  results,  we  split  the  sample  for 
comparison  into  family  and  non-family  firms  and  a  second  category  of  firms  on  the  three 
indices.  We found very clear indications that family firm returns are driven by their growth 
potential and non-family firms by the risk they take on. However, the interesting discovery was 
that risk as measured by accounting figures such as Debt-Equity ratio and Time Interest Earned 
does not behave like other traditional risk factors such as beta.  
 
For the firms on the individual indices, the signs and significance of the factors on the AIM and 
Fledgling are similar but greatly differ from those of the FTSE All Share firms. The returns of 
the FTSE All Share portfolio are driven by Dividend Yield, Book to Price and Trade volume. 
We find that as dividend yield increases it reduces the returns on the portfolio. This may be 
because the market may feel that the earnings could be better spent. As the trading volume 
increases compared to its market capitalisation the returns of the portfolio decreases. This is to 
accommodate the higher costs of trading, so that the net returns (i.e. gross returns net of trading 
costs) are comparable. As the book to price ratio increases it also increases the returns of the 
firm as value firms are considered as ‘fallen angels’ and require higher compensation for the 
added risk.  
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For the AIM and Fledgling portfolio of firms we find that the returns are mainly driven by their 
growth  potential.  The  other  factor  important  is  the  debt-equity  ratio,  which  has  a  negative 
impact on returns as it increases. As mentioned earlier this negativity could be a product of its 
accounting risk rather than market risk. Dividend Yield is also significant but negative as in the 
FTSE All Share portfolio. Again the market may feel that earnings need to be used for future 
investments. The other factor, which is not significant but contrary to our results with the FTSE 
All Share portfolio, is the sign on trade volume. We found a positive sign for the AIM and 
Fledgling index. As the liquidity increases in this market it will improve returns because these 
markets are probably quite illiquid to begin with. So trading increases will help in spreading the 
costs related to trading over each transaction.  
 
The contribution of this research is the finding that family firms can provide a return premium 
higher than their non-family counterparts. Although it must be acknowledged that transaction 
costs were not included for any of the analysis and might affect results. However, the objective 
was  to  determine  if  some  of  the  benefits  and  costs,  which  are  mentioned  in  family  firm 
research,  could  actually  affect  the  market  returns  of  the  firm.  Secondly  we  have  provided 
further understanding of the factors that affect the returns of ‘quoted’ family firms and their 
matched non-family firms. This has identified important characteristics that investors should be 
looking at, when they consider investing in family firms. Through our analysis of the individual 
indices we were able to determine interesting differences in the factors that influence returns. 
However, a more detailed examination of the differences between family and non-family firms 
on each of the indices could reveal further interesting points. This was not possible because of 
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